GitHub Actions has been exploited a lot in a lot of supply chain attacks lately, and workflow misconfigurations have played big roles. It's dangerous to go alone!
Large engineering organizations like to believe their biggest problems are technical. If only someone would approve the budget for the latest tool, everything would be solved. Lately, the prevailing bet is that the silver bullet is vibe coding powered by your favorite flavor of LLM. But the pathologies of large organizations are rarely technical in nature.
The Anthropic Glasswing initiative brings together Amazon Web Services, Apple, Broadcom, Cisco, CrowdStrike, Google, JPMorganChase, the Linux Foundation, Microsoft, NVIDIA, and Palo Alto Networks as launch partners. You can find a lot of posts and reactions on social media as it is definitely a big deal that Anthropic is keeping their Mythos Preview model out of general access.
A new npm supply-chain compromise is targeting the SAP developer ecosystem. The affected packages we are tracking so far are: The pattern is familiar but also a bit different: a trusted package receives a new preinstall hook, the hook runs a new setup.mjs file, and that loader downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime to execute a large obfuscated payload named execution.js. The payload is an 11.7 MB credential stealer and propagation framework.
You would never install an application that can log into your Google docs, read your keystrokes in your browser, intercepts requests in transit, runs continuously, updates silently, AND could be powerful enough to steal your passwords, right? Well, this is more or less what browser extensions can do, and they create vulnerabilities that extend beyond one computer and or even one company.
Version 2026.4.0 of the widely-used @bitwarden/cli npm package (78,000 weekly downloads) has been identified as malicious. The package contains a sophisticated multi-stage credential theft worm that explicitly names itself "Shai-Hulud: The Third Coming", a direct callback to previous Shai-Hulud supply chain campaigns, and targets developer credentials including SSH keys, cloud secrets, and even MCP configuration files.
Mailcow is a widely used self-hosted and open source email server that hosts everything you'd need to manage mailboxes yourself. To assess its security, we set up a local instance and ran our AI pentesting agents against it. We found three XSS vulnerabilities, including a critical vulnerability that allowed unauthenticated attackers to take over administrator accounts while looking at their logs in the UI. Gaining access to a mailbox can have a serious security impact.
It’s been a chaotic few weeks for Axios. First, a major supply chain attack put the package under scrutiny. Then, just days later, headlines started appearing about a “critical 10/10 vulnerability” that could lead to full cloud compromise. If you’ve read the coverage, you’ve probably seen claims like: That sounds bad. But when you look closely at how this vulnerability actually behaves in real environments, the story changes.
Bug bounty has been a very hot topic lately. We’re seeing high-profile programs go offline or fundamentally change: the IBB (one of the most important programs for open-source programs) is pausing submissions, curl is removing payouts and Node.js is removing its bounty entirely. That’s not noise, that's signal.
Hoppscotch is an open-source API development ecosystem, similar to Postman, with over 100,000 monthly users. Two weeks ago, we set up a self-hosted instance and ran our AI pentest agents against it. They found two high-severity vulnerabilities and one medium-severity vulnerability, all present in versions up to and including 2026.2.1, and all patched in 2026.3.0: All three were responsibly disclosed and have been resolved. Note: We accidentally grouped the XSS and an Access Control issue into one report.