Security | Threat Detection | Cyberattacks | DevSecOps | Compliance

Every vendor this year says the same thing: AI is transforming cybersecurity. True, and not useful. Here is the useful version. AI is doing two things at once. It is compressing the time between a vulnerability being found and being exploited, which is the part everyone talks about. And it is quietly installing a brand new attack surface inside your clients' businesses, which is the part nobody is selling against yet.

An employee uploads a spreadsheet to find a sales trend. Another pastes a support conversation into a chatbot to draft a reply. Neither intends to expose business information. Even so, both may send sensitive material outside the systems where your business normally controls it. SMB IT decision-makers need to know what employees share and decide which interactions are acceptable, without building a specialist AI security team.

AI agents are already operating across the enterprise. As they become more autonomous in accessing data, using credentials, executing code, and acting across critical systems, the security boundary is changing with them. The question is no longer whether enterprises will adopt agents. It's how they give agents greater autonomy without giving up control.

Recently, Gemini was running a capture-the-flag exercise in a sandbox operated by the AI testing firm Irregular. Its task was to steal data from a fictional company. On three occasions, the fictional target shared a name with a real business. Gemini slipped past the test’s containment, reached the open internet, and broke into the real company’s systems. In one case it guessed the password. In the other two, it pulled working credentials from a public database of leaked passwords.

Sending privileged material through an external AI service is a disclosure to a third party, and voluntary disclosure to a third party waives privilege. The reasoning is straightforward and a federal court has now applied it. ‍ A second federal court reached the opposite conclusion on the same question within days, on a distinction the first did not draw. The position is genuinely unsettled, and the parts that are settled point at configuration choices rather than at a prohibition. ‍

Almost every obligation in the AI Act is keyed to a risk classification. Work out which tier a system falls into and the duties follow. ‍ Article 4 is not. It applies to providers and deployers of any AI system whatever it does, its subject is people rather than systems, and national authorities began supervising and enforcing it from 2 August 2026 while the high-risk regime moved to December 2027. It is the live one, and it sits outside the structure most governance programs are built on. ‍