We’re excited to share that you can now use Snyk Container to scan container images stored in many more container registries. The latest additions include Github Container Registry, Nexus, DigitalOcean, GitLab Container Registry, and Google Artifact Registry.
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP), founded by Mark Curphey, first released the OWASP Top 10 Web Application Security Risks in 2003. The Top 10 is the closest the development community has to a set of commandments on how to build secure applications. This list represents the most critical risks to software security today and is recognized by developers as the first step toward creating more secure code.
JFrog Artifactory and JFrog Xray recently underwent a rigorous hardening process to earn accreditation for inclusion in the U.S. Department of Defense’s Iron Bank, a centralized repository of digitally-signed and hardened container images. In this blog post, we’re pulling back the curtain on the process, in order to share our insights and lessons learned with our customers and with the DevOps community at large.
There is a growing discussion among network engineers, DevOps teams, and security professionals about the security benefits of bastions. Many assume that they are the “old way” of network access and have little relevance in the modern cloud native stack. These speculations are not irrelevant as in recent years, the corporate IT network perimeter as we knew it is diminishing, and the concept has been shifted to data, identity, and compute perimeter.
Snyk is on the mission to make Static Application Security Testing (SAST) tools work for developers throughout the DevOps pipeline. Snyk Code scans in real time with high accuracy — and it does it right from the tools and workflows developers are already using. For example, the IDE plugins for IntelliJ, PyCharm, WebStorm, and Visual Studio Code make it easy to code, scan and fix even before code hits the version management.
In April 2021, I discovered an attack vector that could allow a malicious Pull Request to a Github repository to gain access to our production environment. Open source companies like us, or anyone else who accepts external contributions, are especially vulnerable to this. For the eager, the attack works by pivoting from a Kubernetes worker pod to the node itself, and from there exfiltrating credentials from the CI/CD system.
