Security | Threat Detection | Cyberattacks | DevSecOps | Compliance

The majority of security teams' work time is devoted to passive mitigation, password rotation, enabling multifactor authentication, or making authentication more complex and giving much more attention to the phone number in recovery than to other factors. Not a communication channel, but rather an identifier, as said, it's used in many aspects of tools, banking, and also e-mail, and when all thieves discover the methods of using it, that's when trouble arrives.

Email is still the most common way attacks begin. Phishing, business email compromise, and brand impersonation all rely on one simple weakness: by default, anyone can send an email that claims to come from your domain. The protocol that email runs on was never built to verify who a sender really is, so a criminal can forge the "From" address to look exactly like it came from your company, and the receiving mail server has no built-in way to know the difference. That is the gap attackers exploit, and it is the gap DMARC was designed to close.

Our digital and physical worlds are now closely linked. This connection brings incredible efficiency, but it also creates new vulnerabilities. When digital systems control physical infrastructure, a security failure can have real, tangible consequences. Protecting your assets today means having a strategy that tackles threats in both these areas at the same time.

For most of the past decade, security advice on credential attacks reduced to a single instruction. Turn on multi-factor authentication. That instruction was correct and it worked, which is precisely why attackers stopped attacking the thing it protects. The current generation of credential campaigns does not try to defeat MFA. It waits for the victim to complete it, then steals what the authentication produced. The password was never the prize. The session was.

Most security teams have a firewall policy, a patch schedule, and a penetration testing calendar. DDoS resilience is often the exception, tested once, checked off, and forgotten until an actual attack exposes the gap. That's a real problem. Distributed denial-of-service threats aren't static, and neither is your infrastructure; the right answer to how often organizations should test depends on several variables, and the baseline is probably more frequent than you'd guess.

Super-botnets and hijacked cloud servers drive new bandwidth and packet-rate records as international law-enforcement pressure pushes attack counts down.